Doe v. Selective Service System: The Constitutionality of Conditioning Student Financial Assistance on Draft Registration by Jacob, Robert D.
University of Minnesota Law School
Scholarship Repository
Minnesota Law Review
1984
Doe v. Selective Service System: The
Constitutionality of Conditioning Student
Financial Assistance on Draft Registration
Robert D. Jacob
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Minnesota Law
Review collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact lenzx009@umn.edu.
Recommended Citation
Jacob, Robert D., "Doe v. Selective Service System: The Constitutionality of Conditioning Student Financial Assistance on Draft
Registration" (1984). Minnesota Law Review. 2231.
https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr/2231
Comment
Doe v. Selective Service System: The
Constitutionality of Conditioning Student
Financial Assistance on Draft Registration
On November 23, 1982, the Minnesota Public Interest Re-
search Group (MPIRG), a student-directed nonprofit organiza-
tion, filed suit in the United States District Court for the
District of Minnesota, challenging section 1113 of the Depart-
ment of Defense Authorization Act of 1983, popularly known as
the Solomon Amendment.1 This amendment conditions the re-
1. P.L. 97-252, 96 Stat. 718 (1982) (codified at 50 U.S.C.A. app. § 462(f)
(1983)). The amendment takes its name from the House sponsor, Representa-
tive Jerry Solomon (R-N.Y.). For the debate on the Solomon Amendment, see
128 CONG. REC. S4942-45 (daily ed. May 12, 1982); 128 CONG. REC. H4756-72 (daily
ed. July 28, 1982).
The full text of the Solomon Amendment is as follows:
SEC. 1113. (a) Section 12 of the Military Selective Service Act (50
U.S.C. App. 462) is amended by adding after subsection (e) the follow-
ing new subsection:
"(f) (1) Any person who is required under section 3 to present him-
self for and submit to registration under such section and fals to do so
in accordance with any proclamation issued under such section, or in
accordance with any rule or regulation issued under such section, shall
be ineligible for any form of assistance or benefit provided under title
IV of the Higher Education Act of 1965.
"(2) In order to receive any grant, loan, or work assistance under
title IV of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1070 et seq.), a
person who is required under section 3 to present himself for and sub-
mit to registration under such section shall file with the institution of
higher education which the person intends to attend, or is attending, a
statement of compliance with section 3 and regulations issued thereun-
der.
"(3) The Secretary of Education, in agreement with the Director,
shall prescribe methods for verifying such statements of compliance
ified pursuant to paragraph (2). Such methods may include requiring
institutions of higher learning to provide a list to the Secretary of Edu-
cation or to the Director of persons who have submitted such state-
ments of compliance.
"(4) The Secretary of Education, in consultation with the Director,
shall issue regulations to implement the requirements of this subsec-
tion. Such regulations shall provide that any person to whom the Sec-
retary of Education proposes to deny assistance or benefits under title
IV for failure to meet the registration requirements of section 3 and the
regulations issued thereunder shall be given notice of the proposed de-
nial and shall have a suitable period (of not less than thirty days) after
such notice to provide the Secretary with information and materials es-
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ceipt of title IV student financial aid on compliance with the
draft registration requirements in section 3 of the Military Se-
lective Service Act.2 The court dismissed MPIRG on January
24, 1983, for lack of standing,3 but simultaneously granted three
anonymous students permissive intervention. 4 On March 9 the
district court preliminarily enjoined the Selective Service Sys-
tem and the Department of Education from enforcing section
1113,5 but permitted them to promulgate regulations pending
the outcome of the case.6 On June 16 the court issued a memo-
randum order and a permanent injunction against further en-
tablishing that he has complied with the registration requirement
under section 3. Such regulations shall also provide that the Secretary
may afford such person an opportunity for a hearing to establish his
compliance or for any other purpose."
(b) The amendment made by subsection (a) shall apply to loans,
grants, or work assistance under title IV of the Higher Education Act
for periods of instruction beginning after June 30, 1983.
2. Section 3 of the Military Selective Service Act, 50 U.S.C. app. § 453
(Supp. V 1981), empowers the President to require by proclamation the regis-
tration of every male citizen and male resident alien between the ages of 18
and 21. Section 12 of the Act, 50 U.S.C. app. § 462 (Supp. V 1981), to which the
Solomon Amendment was added, imposes criminal penalties for violations of
the Act. Draft registration was discontinued in 1975 but reinstated by President
Carter in 1980 in response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Proclamation
No. 4771, 3 C.F.R. 82 (1980), reprinted in 50 U.S.C. app. § 453 at 887-88 (Supp. V
1981).
3. Minnesota Pub. Interest Research Group v. Selective Serv. Sys., 557 F.
Supp. 925 (D. Minn. 1983). Judge Donald D. Alsop presided over the case in the
district court.
4. Minnesota Pub. Interest Research Group v. Selective Serv. Sys., 557 F.
Supp. 923 (D. Minn. 1983). The three students, identified only as John Doe,
Richard Roe, and Paul Poe, alleged that they lived in Minnesota, needed
financial aid to pursue their education, intended to apply for title IV assistance,
and had -failed to register as required with the Selective Service System. Doe v.
Selective Serv. Sys., 557 F. Supp. 937, 938 (D. Minn. 1983) [hereinafter Doe I].
Their suit was informally consolidated with that of three other anonymous stu-
dents, identified as Bradley Boe, Carl Coe, and Frank Foe. See Brief for the
Appellants at 7, Selective Serv. Sys. v. Minnesota Pub. Interest Research
Group, 52 U.S.L.W. 3440 (No. 83-276, prob. juris. noted Dec. 5, 1983).
5. Doe I, 557 F. Supp. 937. The district court applied the preliminary in-
junction test set forth in Dataphase Sys. v. C.T. Sys., Inc., 640 F.2d 109, 114 (8th
Cir. 1981). The court found that even though the plaintiffs had not yet applied
for-and hence had not yet been denied-title IV assistance, they still faced the
threat of irreparable harm because it was "inevitable that plaintiffs will be
denied financial assistance and, consequently, the opportunity to pursue their
educations." Doe I, 557 F. Supp. at 940.
6. Doe I, 557 F. Supp. at 941. The proposed implementing regulations had
already been published when the court issued the preliminary injunction. See
48 Fed. Reg. 3,920 (1983) (proposed Jan. 27, 1983). After changing some sections
to ease the administrative burden of compliance on colleges and universities,
the Department of Education released the final regulations in April 1983. 48
Fed. Reg. 15,578 (1983) (codified at 34 C.F.R. § 668.23-.28 (1983)). Both the pro-
posed and the final regulations permitted students to register late and still
qualify for title IV assistance. See infra note 30.
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forcement of section 1113 or the regulations promulgated
thereunder, holding that the section was an unconstitutional
bill of attainder and violated the fifth amendment privilege
against self-incrimination. Doe v. Selective Service System, No.
3-82 Civ. 1670 (D. Minn. June 16, 1983).7 Thirteen days later the
United States Supreme Court stayed the order8 the Court is
expected to decide the case in the summer of 1984.9
This Comment addresses the bill of attainder and fifth
amendment issues raised by Doe v. Selective Service System.' 0
Part I discusses the Supreme Court's attainder decisions and
7. [Hereinafter Doe II]. The district court incorporated by reference the
findings and reasoning of the March 9 decision.
8. Selective Serv. Sys. v. Doe, 103 S. Ct. 3574 (1983).
9. Doe v. Selective Serv. Sys., No. 3-82 Civ. 1670 (D. Minn. June 16, 1983),
prob. juris noted, Selective Serv. Sys. v. Minnesota Pub. Interest Research
Group, 52 U.S.L.W. 3440 (No. 83-276). The case is before the Supreme Court on
direct appeal from the district court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1252 (1976).
10. The district court did not reach the merits of the plaintiffs' equal pro-
tection, Privacy Act, and Presidential Proclamation claims. Doe II, 557 F. Supp.
at 950.
At various phases of the litigation, plaintiffs alleged that § 1113 violated the
equal protection clause because it discriminated based on race, sex, and
wealth. See Intervening Plaintiffs' Memorandum on Standing and Ripeness
and In Support of a Preliminary Injunction at 29-33, Doe I; Joint Memorandum
in Opposition to Appellant's Application for a Stay Pending Appeal at 16-18, Se-
lective Serv. Sys. v. Doe, 103 S. Ct. 3574 (1983).
The racial discrimination claim seems to be precluded by Washington v.
Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976), because § 1113 is neutral on its face and there is no
evidence of an intent to discriminate. Likewise, since the Court upheld the
constitutionality of male-only registration in Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57
(1981), the sex discrimination claim has little merit because any disparity it im-
poses between males and females serves "important governmental objectives,"
and the means employed are "substantially related to the achievement of those
objectives." See Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982).
Finally, the wealth discrimination claim is unlikely to be successful since the
Court held that a statute's unfavorable impact on the poor does not make it un-
constitutional as long as it furthers a legitimate governmental purpose. See
San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 55 (1973).
MPIRG further alleged that allowing certain information about students to
"flow" between the Selective Service System and the Department of Education
was a violation of the Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a(a)-(e) (1982). Plain-
tiff's Memorandum in Support of Its Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 54-56,
Doe I. But while the Privacy Act protects against unauthorized transfers of in-
formation between agencies, it is untenable to argue that the Solomon Amend-
ment's verification procedure "violates" it. Even assuming that the sharing of
information authorized by the Solomon Amendment does not fall under one of
the Privacy Act's stated exceptions, Congress impliedly created an exception to
the Privacy Act by enacting the specific provisions of the Solomon Amendment
relating to verification of registration status by the Selective Service.
Plaintiffs also contended that Proclamation 4771, reinstating registration,
was not promulgated according to law because it took effect before the 30-day
waiting period required by the Military Selective Service Act for all regulations
issued under its authority. On July 19, 1983, however, the Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals rejected the argument that this requirement applied to proclama-
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suggests that the punishment element is the most critical as-
pect of these cases. This part concludes that, because the Solo-
mon Amendment is escapable, its sanction does not constitute
punishment for bill of attainder purposes. Part II analyzes the
fifth amendment challenge to the Solomon Amendment and
distinguishes the choice facing a nonregistrant who needs
financial aid from the "cruel trilemma" of the Supreme Court's
economic penalty cases. The Comment concludes, therefore,
that the Solomon Amendment is neither a bill of attainder nor
an unconstitutional infringement on fifth amendment rights.
I. THE BILL OF ATTAINDER ISSUE
A bill of attainder is (1) a legislative act; (2) imposing pun-
ishment; (3) upon a designated person or class of persons;" (4)
without a judicial trial.12 Although bills of attainder originated
in English common law,' 3 they were also common during the
American Revolutionary period when all thirteen colonies
passed anti-Tory legislation.14 To end this practice, the consti-
tutional Framers adopted article I, sections 9 and 10, prohibit-
ing bills of attainder.' 5
tions as well as to regulations. See United States v. Wayte, 710 F.2d 1385 (9th
Cir. 1983).
11. Hereinafter, this element will be referred to as the specificity element.
12. This four-part definition, suggested by the Court in United States v.
Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 315 (1946), quoted in United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437,
448-49 (1965), provides a convenient means of analyzing bills of attainder. See
Lehmann, The Bill of Attainder Doctrine: A Survey of the Decisional Law, 5
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 767, 790-91 (1978).
13. Lehmann, supra note 12, at 771 (describing the strict structural format
of parliamentary bills of attainder). See also 1 Jac. 2, ch. 2, 3 STATS. U.K. 403
(1685) (bill attainting James, Duke of Monmouth), quoted in Lehmann, supra
note 12, at 771.
English bills of attainder imposed the penalty of death and the corruption
of blood. The corruption of blood made the bill of attainder an especially se-
vere penalty upon the family of the person attainted, since that person "could
neither inherit lands from his ancestors nor retain those he already possessed,
nor transmit them by descent to any heir." Z. CHAFEE, THREE HumAN RiGHTs IN
THE CONSTrrUTION 96 (1956).
14. See generally C. VAN TYNE, THE LOYALISTS IN THE AMERICAN REVOLU-
TION app. B-C (1902); Dolan, Evolution of the Bill of Attainder in the United
States, 2 CATH. U.L. REV. 27, 28-29 (1952); Thompson, Anti-Loyalist Legislation
During the American Revolution, 3 Nw. U.L. REV. 81, 147 (1908).
15. The Constitutional provision that applies to the federal government
reads: "No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto law shall be passed." U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 9, cl. 3. A corresponding provision prohibits the states from passing
bills of attainder. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cL 1. Although different constitutional
sections govern, no Supreme Court decision suggests that different standards
apply to state and federal bills of attainder. See Annot., Bills of Attainder, 53 L
Ed.2d 1273, 1277 (1977).
Commentators have disagreed over what evil the framers hoped to prevent,
[Vol. 68:677
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
In the 1865 landmark cases of Cummings v. Missouri'6 and
Ex Parte Garland,7 the United States Supreme Court first ex-
plicated the American bill of attainder doctrine. The Court
struck down laws requiring people to swear they had never
manifested sympathy with the Confederacy to qualify for cer-
tain specified vocations.18 As the Cummings Court empha-
perhaps because these prohibitions were adopted by the Constitutional Con-
vention unanimously and without debate. See J. MADISON, JOURNAL OF THE
FEDERAL CONVENION 586, 727-28 (J. Scott ed. 1893). One commentator has ar-
gued that the prohibition was intended as "a broad implementation of the sepa-
ration of powers... designed to limit the legislature in much the same way as
the case and controversy requirement of article M limits the judiciary." Note,
The Bounds of Legislative Specification: A Suggested Approach to the Bill of
Attainder Clause, 72 YALE L.J. 330, 366 (1962) [hereinafter cited as Yale Note].
Another commentator, while not denying the significance of the separation of
powers strand, emphasized that the "constitutional proscription of bills of at-
tainder is a guarantee of procedural due process." Note, The Supreme Court's
Bill of Attainder Doctrine: A Need for Clarification, 54 CALIF. L REv. 212, 213
(1966) [hereinafter cited as California Note]. An interesting counterpoint to
these two themes, both of which encouraged a liberalization of the Court's in-
terpretation of the bill of attainder clause, was offered by Raoul Berger. Criti-
cizing the Court's punishment test as "an accordion-like tool of shifting judicial
fancy," he called for a return to a more limited construction of the doctrine:
"What distinguished the bill of attainder was not the fact of punishment, but
its nature-death and corruption of blood." Berger, Bills of Attainder: A Study
of Amendment by the Court, 63 CORNELL L. REv. 355, 396 (1978).
Ironically, the origin of the liberalization of attainder doctrine lay in the
non-bill of attainder case of Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810),
wherein Chief Justice Marshall stated that "a bill of attainder may affect the
life of an individual, or may confiscate his property, or may do both." Id. at 138.
He thereby extended this constitutional protection to what had been known in
England as bills of pains and penalties, statutes similar to bills of attainder but
imposing such less severe penalties as imprisonment, confiscation, or banish-
ment. See Z. CHAFES, supra note 13, at 97.
16. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277 (1867).
17. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333 (1867).
18. Cummings was a Roman Catholic priest convicted of teaching and
preaching without first taking the loyalty oath required by the Missouri Consti-
tution. The oath contained both prospective and retrospective elements: those
required to take the oath not only had to affirn their allegiance to the United
States and its Constitution, but also had to swear that they had "never, directly
or indirectly, done any of the acts in [art. II, §3] specified." Mo. CONsT. art. 11,
§ 6 (1865), quoted in Cummings, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 280-81. The list of prohib-
ited actions in § 3 ranged from having "been in armed hostility to the United
States" to such lesser evils as having "manifested ... sympathy with those en-
gaged in ... rebellion against the United States." Mo. CONsT. art. II, § 3, quoted
in Cummings, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 282 (emphasis added).
The Court reversed Cummings's conviction, striking down the oath require-
ment as meeting the bill of attainder definition of a "legislative act, which in-
flicts punishment without a judicial trial." Cummings, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 323.
Justice Field reasoned that the oath provision did not constitute a valid qualifi-
cation for the specified callings. Id. at 320. Such an interference with a per-
son's right to free access to "all avocations, all honors, all positions ... for past
conduct is punishment, and can be in no otherwise defined." Id. at 321-22.
In Garland, decided the same day as Cummings, the Court struck down a
1984]
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sized, the expurgatory oath requirement was punitive rather
than regulatory because it had been passed "to reach the per-
son, not the calling."'19
In the twentieth century, the Court has struggled to distin-
guish legitimate government regulation from impermissible leg-
islative punishment. In the 1946 case of United States v.
Lovett,2o the Court emphasized the procedural due process as-
pects of the bill of attainder doctrine while invalidating an ap-
propriations bill rider that cut off the salaries of three
government officials accused of subversive activity.2 1 The
Court adopted a more formalistic approach, however, when
faced with less particularized Communist control legislation in
American Communications Association v. Douds22 and Com-
munist Party of the United States v. Subversive Activities Con-
trol Board (SACB).23 Douds and SACB upheld federal
statutes limiting Communist involvement in labor union activ-
ity because, in the opinion of the Court, the statutes merely
regulated present activity and did not punish past conduct.24
federal statute requiring all lawyers practicing in the federal courts to swear to
a loyalty oath similar to that involved in Cummings. Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wail.)
at 336-37. The Court declared that the statute constituted "a legislative decree
of perpetual exclusion" from a profession and, thus, was an impermissible pun-
ishment for past acts. Id. at 377.
19. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 320.
20. 328 U.S. 303 (1946).
21. The Court struck down § 304 of the Urgent Deficiency Appropriation
Act of 1943, a rider that prohibited the use of appropriated funds to pay for
services performed after a specified date by three named individuals found
guilty of "subversive activity" in a special appropriations subcommittee investi-
gation. Justice Black, writing for the majority, concluded after investigating the
legislative history of § 304 that the rider was intended not merely to prohibit
the payment of compensation out of appropriated funds, but also to "purge" the
federal government of employees it considered "unfit" because of their political
affiliations. Lovett 328 U.S. at 314. Like traditional bills of attainder, it applied
to certain named individuals, and the sanction imposed mirrored those invali-
dated by the Court in Cummings and Garland. Id. at 315-16. It was to prevent
just such "punishment without trial by duly constituted courts" that the Fram-
ers had banned bills of attainder. Id. at 317.
22. 339 U.S. 382 (1950).
23. 367 U.S. 1 (1961). The formalistic approach had been suggested by Jus-
tice Frankfurter in his concurring opinion in Lovett. 328 U.S. at 321. Justice
Frankfurter read the bill of attainder clause more narrowly because the clause
had its roots in "specific grievances," and thus its meaning was constrained by
historical experience. Id. Justice Frankfurter argued that § 304 not only failed
to conform to the structural pattern of parliamentary attainders but also lacked
punishment in the sense appropriate for bills of attainder. Id. at 324. He found
no punitive motive on the face of the statute and, unlike Justice Black, refused
to delve into the legislative history to find one. Id.
24. In Douds the Court upheld § 9(h) of the National Labor Relations Act
of 1947, which conditioned NLRB recognition of labor unions on the filing of af-
fidavits by its officers affirming that they were not members of the Communist
[Vol. 68:677
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But only four years after SACB, in the 1965 case of United
States v. Broum,25 the Court echoed the sweeping language of
Cummings in invalidating a federal statute that attached to
past Communist activity. Although not expressly overruling
Douds and SACB, the Court indicated that it would interpret
the bill of attainder doctrine not with a narrow historical focus
but rather "in light of the evil the Framers had sought to bar.
legislative punishment, of any form or severity, of specifically
designated persons or groups." 26 Finally, in its most recent in-
terpretation of the bill of attainder clause, the Court upheld the
Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation Act in
Nixon v. Administrator of General Services,2 7 even though the
Act specifically named former President Nixon, because it was
deemed to have a nonpunitive, regulatory purpose.28
Party or any other organization advocating the violent overthrow of the govern-
ment. Douds, 339 U.S. at 385-86. Chief Justice Vinson distinguished Cummings,
Garland, and Lovett because "the individuals involved were in fact being pun-
ished for past actions; whereas in this case they are subject to possible loss of
position only because there is substantial ground for the congressional judg-
ment that their beliefs and loyalties will be transformed into future conduct."
Id. at 413. Moreover, those subject to the requirements of § 9(h) were free to
escape its prohibition "by a voluntary alteration of... loyalties" enabling them
to sign the affidavit. Id. at 414.
In SACB the Court upheld another Communist registration provision. Sec-
tion 7(a) of the Subversive Activities Control Act required all Communist-ac-
tion organizations to register with the attorney general. The Communist Party
alleged that the "onerous consequences of registration," including, inter alia,
restrictions on union involvement and passport availability, indicated that the
requirement was actually designed to make registration impossible, thus estab-
lishing a pretext for criminal prosecution of the Party and its members. SACB,
367 U.S. at 16-17, 82.
25. 381 U.S. 437 (1965).
26. Id. at 447. In Brown the Court struck down § 504 of the Labor Manage-
ment Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, enacted to replace § 9(h) of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act, which the Court had upheld in Douds. Id. at 439.
Section 504 made it a crime to serve as an officer of a hibor union during or
within five years of one's membership in the Communist Party. The Court
found the specificity element present because § 504 designated a particular or-
ganization in inflicting its disqualification upon members of the Communist
Party. Id. at 451-52. Section 504 also fulfilled the punishment requirement be-
cause, unlike the statutes in Douds and SACB, its five-year retrospective fea-
ture rendered it inescapable. Id. at 458. But while distinguishing Douds on this
point, Chief Justice Warren nonetheless undercut Douds's reliance upon the
prospective/retrospective dichotomy in determining whether or not a statute
attaints. Id. at 457-60; see infra notes 103-04 and accompanying text.
27. 433 U.S. 425 (1977).
28. The Act provided that the Administrator of General Services should
take custody of former President Nixon's tapes and papers, promulgate regula-
tions for public access, and screen the materials so that the private materials
could be returned to Nixon. Id. at 425, 433-37. The Act was in large part a re-
sponse to an executory agreement between Nixon and GSA Administrator
Sampson which permitted withdrawal of written materials by Nixon after three
1984]
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A. THE DISTRICT COURT'S ANALYSIS OF THE BEL OF ATrAINDER
ISSUE
In Doe v. Selective Service System, the government con-
ceded that the Solomon Amendment is a legislative act which
inflicts deprivation without judicial trial. The district court de-
termined that the amendment also satisfied the remaining bill
of attainder criteria of specificity and punishment.
Although section 1113 does not name any particular indi-
viduals or groups, the court found that it met the specificity re-
quirement by singling out "an identifiable group based on the
act of nonregistration."29 The government, on the other hand,
contended that because the Department of Education's imple-
menting regulations purported to permit students who had
missed the statutory registration deadline to escape the
financial aid disqualification by registering late, section 1113
constituted permissible regulation of present and future con-
duct rather than impermissible punishment of past action.3 0
years and destruction of the tapes after five years. Id. at 430-32. See McGowan,
Presidents and Their Papers, 68 MIN. L. REV. 409 (1983). Rejecting the attain-
der challenge to the Act, Justice Brennan indicated that the former President
constituted a "legitimate class of one," 433 U.S. at 472, and that the Act served
the nonpunitive regulatory function of "preserving the availability of judicial
evidence and of historically relevant materials," id. at 478-79. The three tests of
punishment Justice Brennan applied to reach this conclusion are set forth in
the analysis of the district court's handling of the punishment issue in Doe, see
infra notes 32-39 and accompanying text.
29. Doe II, No. 3-82 Civ. 1670 at 4. See also Doe I, 557 F. Supp. at 942 (noting
plaintiffs' contention that the Solomon Amendment "is directed at a specific
group of persons, i.e., young male students who require financial aid but cannot
complete truthful statements of compliance"). It is unclear whether the court
meant to indicate that § 1113 attached to past actions because it included some
students who were already in violation of the registration law at the time the
Solomon Amendment was passed, or because it would disqualify students who
had not registered as of the time they appliedfor aid, even though they might
have turned 18 after passage of § 1113. Presumably, it meant the latter, and
there is substantial support for the view that bills of attainder may apply pro-
spectively. See authorities cited infra note 101. But even those who maintain
that an enactment cannot be a bill of attainder unless it operates retrospec-
tively recognize that cases in which the statute applies both to some persons
already "fixed" by their past behavior and to others who may in the future
come under its provisions, the retrospective effect on the former group is
enough to satisfy the bill of attainder specificity requirement. See Note, Pun-
ishment: Its Meaning in Relation to Separation of Power and Substantive Con-
stitutional Restrictions and Its Use in the Lovett, Trop, Perez, and Speiser
Cases, 34 IND. L.J. 231, 251-52 (1959).
30. Doe I, 557 F. Supp. at 942. The Department of Education's regulation
pertaining to late regulation reads:
A student who was notified under paragraph [a] [2] of this section [re-
quiring written notice prior to denial of aid] and has not registered al-
though required to do so may establish his eligibility for title IV aid for
the payment period in which he was notified under paragraph [a] [2] of
[Vol. 68:677
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Rejecting this argument, the district court found that the regu-
lations failed to remedy the constitutional defect of section 1113
because they are void to the extent that they "contradict the
plain meaning of the statute."31
In determining that the deprivation imposed by the Solo-
mon Amendment constitutes punishment, the district court ap-
plied the three tests for punishment articulated by Justice
Brennan in Nixon: (1) a historical test comparing the statutory
sanction to those traditionally invalidated as bills of attainder;32
(2) a functional test asking whether the challenged law "rea-
sonably can be said to further nonpunitive legislative pur-
poses;" 33 and (3) an inquiry into the legislative record for
evidence of a "congressional intent to punish."3 4 In describing
the first test, Justice Brennan cited the barring of designated
persons from specified vocations as the special contribution of
American attainder cases to the list of traditional parliamen-
tary punishments, primarily confiscation, banishment, impris-
onment, and death.35 The district court in Doe reasoned that
although "denial of federal financial aid is not a historical pun-
ishment," depriving a student of the federal financial aid neces-
sary to continue his education was essentially an indirect
means of barring nonregistrants from their chosen vocations. 36
Applying the second Nixon test, the district court failed to find
a nonpunitive purpose that could sustain section 1113.37 The
court concluded that encouraging registration was not a suffi-
cient rationale because "every 'punishment' could be renamed
an 'encouragement' thereby escaping the Constitution's pro-
scription on bills of attainder."38 Finally, the court cited several
floor statements from the congressional debate over the Solo-
mon Amendment as revealing "an obvious intent to punish
nonregistrants."3 9
this section by registering, filing a Statement of Registration Compli-
ance, and, if required, verifying that he is registered ....
34 C.F. § 668.27[b] [1] (1983)).
31. Doe II, No. 3-82 Civ. 1670 at 4.
32. Nixon, 433 U.S. at 473.
33. Id. at 475-76.
34. Id. at 478.
35. Id. at 473.
36. Doe I, 557 F. Supp. at 943.
37. The district court rejected the defendants' claim that § 1113 was a
permissable regulation "because its rational nonpunitive purposes are (a) to
encourage compliance with registration laws, (b) to promote a just allocation of
scarce aid dollars, and (c) to assist the Selective Service in its enforcement of
draft registration laws." Id. at 944.
38. Id. at 944-45.
39. The district court cited the following statements from the congressional
19841
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B. A SUGGESTED APPLICATION OF THE NIXON PUNISHMENT
TEST
The district court's attainder analysis fails because, by re-
jecting the possibility of escape represented by the Department
of Education's regulations, the court failed to recognize the Sol-
omon Amendment's legitimizing nonpunitive purpose: encour-
aging nonregistrants to remedy their violation by signing up
late. The escapability of a legislative sanction, although some-
times discussed in terms of the somewhat ambiguous specific-
ity requirement,40 is most probative of whether the challenged
act inflicts punishment. To appreciate the significance of the
escapability factor in this case, it is useful first to outline the
punishment analysis assuming, as the district court did, that
the sanction of the Solomon Amendment is inescapable. The
following analysis draws on the three-part Nixon punishment
test, interpreted in light of the Supreme Court's analysis of
punishment in other contexts, 4 1 and the suggestions of
debate: "I intend to offer the same amendment [to other government benefits
legislation] every year until every young man is deprived of Federal assistance
unless he has obeyed the law ... " 128 CONG. REC. H4757 (daily ed. July 28,
1982) (statement of Rep. Solomon), quoted in Doe 1, 557 F. Supp. at 945; "If
young men do not think enough of their country to defend it, I do not see any
reason at all why they should get benefits from that country," 128 CONG. REC.
H4757 (daily ed. July 29, 1982) (statement of Rep. Mitchell), quoted in Doe I, 557
F. Supp. at 945; 'This [bill is] an important signal to every American that this
Congress will not tolerate any willful, blatant rejection of the responsibilities
which come from living in a free nation," 128 CONG. REc. S4944 (daily ed. May
12, 1982) (statement of Sen. Hayakawa), quoted in Doe I, 557 Supp. at 945.
40. For a discussion of the irrelevancy of a statute's escapability to the
specificity question, see infra note 104. This is only, one area, however, in
which the status of the specificity requirement is unclear. For example, some
courts have misinterpreted language in Broum as requiring that bills of attain-
der specify by name rather than as a group or class based on past actions. See
Lehmann, supra note 12, at 973-82. Interestingly, the Cummings bill of attain-
der definition, "a legislative act which inflicts punishment without a judicial
trial," 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 323, did not include a separate specificity element.
Lehmann believes that modern courts should learn from this omission. While
admitting that the degree of specificity is probative of whether the statute is
regulatory or punitive, and of whether the plaintiff has standing to challenge it
in court, he argues that according specificity "decisive importance is to prevent
the [constitutional] proscriptions [against bills of attainder] . . .from serving
as a meaningful check on legislative usurpation of judicial functions." Leh-
mann, supra note 12, at 982.
41. The diversity of approaches the Court has taken in an effort to articu-
late a manageable definition of punishment is evident from Justice Goldberg's
laundry list of tests:
Whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint,
whether it has historically been regarded as punishment, whether it
comes into play only on a finding of scienter, whether its operation will
promote the traditional aims of punishment-retribution and deter-
rence, whether the behavior to which it applies is already a crime,
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commentators.42
The initial Nixon test of historical experience, which con-
centrates on the gravity of the sanction rather than its purpose,
is rarely dispositive of whether a given sanction constitutes
punishment.4 3 Even relatively severe disabilities may serve
purposes other than punishment.4 Although Justice Brennan
did not contend that sanctions corresponding to those on his
list of historical punishments constituted punishment per se,
but rather were "immediately constitutionally suspect,"45 com-
mentators have noted that even this heightened scrutiny seems
inappropriate with respect to relatively less severe penalties,
such as confiscation of property and denial of employment.46
Notwithstanding the district court's statements about the im-
portance of financial aid to a student's career,47 disqualification
from a government benefit program seems hardly of sufficient
magnitude to raise a presumption of punishment under the
first Nixon test.
Although deprivation of a government benefit may not be
"immediately constitutionally suspect" under Nixon's first test,
it does not follow that it cannot constitute punishment under
whether an alternative purpose to which it may rationally be connected
is assignable for it, and whether it appears excessive in relation to the
alternative purpose assigned, are all relevant to the inquiry, and may
often point in differing directions.
Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1963) (holding that divest-
ing an American of his citizenship for leaving the country to avoid the draft
constitutes an impermissible punishment).
42. For the most comprehensive recent article on the punishment issue,
the basic approach of which is followed in this Comment, see Clark, Civil and
Criminal Penalties and Forfeitures: A Framework for Constitutional Analysis,
60 MmN. L. REV. 379 (1976). See also Note, Toward a Constitutional Definition
of Punishmen 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1667, 1685 (1980) (suggesting, in the context
of a discussion of Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979), a definition of punishment
combining the requirements that the sanction be a deprivation of a legal right
imposedfor a prior offense and objectively related to the goals of deterrence or
social condemnation).
43. See Lehmann, supra note 12, at 1005 ("The majority opinion [in Nixon]
errs by divorcing the nature of the sanction from the motive for imposing it.");
but see California Note, supra note 15, at 242 (suggesting that when "the chal-
lenged statute imposes a deprivation typically associated with bills of attain-
der," the punishment element is satisfied and the attainder analysis depends
upon whether it was "imposed with the prohibited specificity without judicial
trial").
44. Clark suggests that practically all sanctions are capable of serving
nonpunitive purposes, the only exceptions being "such outmoded [ones] as
whipping and pillorying." Clark, supra note 42, at 456. See generally H. PACK-
ER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRUnAL SANCTION 23-31 (1968).
45. Nixon, 433 U.S. at 473.
46. See Lehmann, supra note 12, at 1005.
47. Doe I, 557 F. Supp. at 943-44.
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any circumstances. In Doe, the government cited language
from Flemming v. Nestor48 for the proposition that a "mere de-
nial of a noncontractual governmental benefit" was not punish-
ment for bill of attainder purposes. 49 Flemming, however,
which upheld a federal statute disqualifying certain classes of
deported aliens from receiving social security benefits, does not
support so broad a reading. In that case, the Supreme Court
not only looked to the nature of the sanction, but also con-
cluded that the bill's legislative history lacked sufficient evi-
dence of a punitive congressional intent.50 Furthermore, any
doubt raised by Flemming about whether a financial aid cut-off
could constitute punishment would seem to have been resolved
five years later when the Supreme Court in Brown quoted
Cummings to the effect that "[tihe deprivation of any rights,
civil or political, previously enjoyed, may be punishment, the
circumstances attending and the cause of the deprivation de-
termining this fact."5 ' Thus, once a court concludes that the
legislative sanction, whatever its severity, could serve as pun-
ishment, an inquiry into the legislative purpose, the focus of
48. 363 U.S. 603 (1960).
49. Id. at 617, quoted in Doe 1, 557 F. Supp. at 943. For a pre-Broum analy-
sis of the impact of Flemming on bill of attainder punishment analysis, see
Yale Note, supra note 15, at 358-60 (concluding that the right/privilege dichot-
omy is inconsistent with the underlying rationale of the bill of attainder clause
as "a blanket prohibition of legislative exercise of the adjudicating function").
50. Justice Harlan wrote that Flemming failed to show that "the language
and structure of § 202(n), or the nature of the deprivation, requires us to recog-
nize a punitive design." Flemming, 363 U.S. at 616-17 (emphasis added). Thus,
Justice Harlan seemed to have applied a two-part test analogous to the twin
considerations of gravity and purpose embodied in the Nixon test. First, the
nature of the deprivation was not such that it would be 'immediately constitu-
tionally suspect" under Nixon's historical test, 433 U.S. at 473, since it was "the
mere denial of a noncontractual governmental benefit," Flemming, 363 U.S. at
617. Second, an examination of the section itself, in light of the relevant legisla-
tive history, indicated the presence of an alternative nonpunitive motive. If the
first factor alone had been determinative, there would have been no need to
proceed to the second.
Although courts continue to cite Flemming in cases that find changes in
various benefit programs to be nonpunitive, they typically base their decision
on the presence of an independent nonpunitive purpose for the government ac-
tion. See, e.g., Monaco v. United States, 523 F.2d 935, 939-40 (9th Cir. 1975) (up-
holding the Dual Compensation Act of 1964 as necessary to remove inequities
in civil service seniority conferred on veterans as opposed to nonveterans);
Anderson v. Social Sec. Admin., 567 F. Supp. 410 (D. Colo. 1983) (suspension of
Social Security benefits of incarcerated felons not involved in rehabilitation
program held remedial rather than punitive).
51. Brow, 381 U.S. at 448 (quoting Cummings, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 320).
That Justice Field did not mean by his reference to civil or political rights to
exclude from bill of attainder protection punitive denials of governmental privi-
leges is indicated by his observation that the oath requirement impermissibly
punished people for their past Confederate involvement by "depriving ...
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the two remaining Nixon tests, is an indispensable next step.52
The second Nixon test emphasizes a functional analysis:
"whether the law under challenge, viewed in terms of the type
and severity of burdens imposed, reasonably can be said to fur-
ther nonpunitive legislative purposes."5 3 Although the Court
has never delineated a clear standard for determining whether
a stated purpose is nonpunitive,5 4 a workable one may be de-
rived from Herbert Packer's suggestion that a sanction consti-
tutes punishment only if "imposed for the dominant purpose of
[them] of some of the rights and privileges of the citizen." Cummings, 71 U.S.
(4 Wall.) at 320 (emphasis added).
Moreover, since Flemming, the right/privilege distinction has lost most of
its significance in constitutional law generally. The case most identified with
this trend is Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970), holding that a challenge to a
state's termination of welfare payments "cannot be answered by an argument
that public assistance benefits are 'a "privilege" and not a "right." ' " Id. at 262
(quoting Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 627 n.6 (1969)). Lehmann has ob-
served that Flemming is probably of questionable precedential value in light of
this language in Goldberg. Lehmann, supra note 12, at 858-59. See generally
Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional
Law, 81 HARV. L. REV. 439 (1968); but cf. Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 353 n.4
(1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (contending that the Court, by defining prop-
erty narrowly in its due process analysis, is resurrecting the right/privilege dis-
tinction).
For an example of a statutory government benefit disqualification that
might well constitute a bill of attainder, see Blitz v. Donovan, 538 F. Supp. 1119
(D.D.C. 1982) (district court invalidation, on first amendment grounds, of an ap-
propriations rider banning CETA funding to anyone who, within the last five
years, had publicly advocated the violent overthrow of the government), va-
cated as moot, 103 S. Ct. 711 (1983).
52. But see Note, The Bill of Attainder Clause: An Unqualified Guarantee
of Process, 50 BROoKLyN L. REv. 77 (1983). The author concludes that the Solo-
mon Amendment is an unconstitutional bill of attainder under the Cummings
test, quoted in text accompanying supra note 51. Id. at 102, 108-09. While it is
apparent that under Cummings a deprivation of student aid may constitute
punishment, whether it actually does depends on "the circumstances attending
and the causes of the deprivation." Cummings, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 320 (empha-
sis added). The author of the Note apparently dismisses the need for such an
inquiry, stating that the legislation is a bill of attainder if its means "impose
punitive restrictions on previously enjoyed rights," even if the legislative pur-
pose is "perfectly justifiable." Note, supra, at 104. See also id. at 110 n.195.
Without a definition of punishment that includes some sort of purposive ele-
ment, however, every piece of regulatory legislation that imposes burdens on
some identifiable group would be vulnerable to bill of attainder attack.
53. Nixon, 433 U.S. at 475-76.
54. See Note, supra note 42, at 1672 nn.35-36, 1674 n.52. The author suggests
that a test, like Nixon's functional one, that determines whether a statute in-
flicts punishment by considering whether it is rationally related to a nonpuni-
tive purpose has a circularity problem. That is, such a test merely shifts the
definitional inquiry from whether a given sanction constitutes punishment to
whether a suggested alternative purpose is punitive. The author also notes that
although a theory of what motives are punitive can be inferred from the court's
position regarding the purposes of punishment, courts usually do not articulate
this connection. Id.
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preventing offenses against legal rules or of exacting retribu-
tion from offenders, or both."95 Thus, for an alternative justifi-
cation to qualify as nonpunitive, its dominant purpose must be
neither retributive nor deterrent. Furthermore, to satisfy this
functional test, the government must show more than a mere
tangential relationship between the sanction and the proffered
nonpunitive purpose.5 6 A court not only must consider the rea-
sonableness of the alternative purpose in light of "the type and
severity of [the] burdens imposed,"5 7 but also should "inquire
into the existence of less burdensome alternatives by which
*. . [Congress] could have achieved its legitimate nonpunitive
objectives."5 8
The third Nixon test, "inquiring whether the legislative
55. H. PACKER, supra note 44, at 31. Packer adds this requirement to a five-
part definition of punishment set forth by H.L-. Hart:
i. It must involve pain or other consequences normally considered
unpleasant.
ii. It must be for an offense against legal rules.
iii. It must be of an actual or supposed offender for his offense.
iv. It must be intentionally administered by human beings other
than the offender.
v. It must be imposed and administered by an authority consti-
tuted by a legal system against which the offense is committed.
H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONsmnTY 4-5 (1968). Packer asserts that
his addition is necessary to distinguish punishment from such permissible
sanctions as those imposed for compensation, regulation, and prevention. H.
PACKER, supra note 44, at 31. Some have argued that Packer's addition is al-
ready implicit in Hart's third element, see, e.g., Griffiths, Book Review, 79 YALE
L.J. 1388, 1406-13 (1970), while others have been content to note that both defini-
tions contain a purposive element, see, e.g., Clark, supra note 42, at 432.
There is some judicial recognition of this approach to defining punishment
based on its purposes. In Mendoza-Martinez, Justice Goldberg listed as a crite-
rion "whether its operation will promote the traditional aims of punishment-
retribution and deterrence." 372 U.S. at 168. See also Chief Justice Warren's
explanation in Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S 86 (1957), that "[i]f the statute imposes a
disability for the purposes of punishment-that is, to reprimand the wrongdoer,
to deter others, etc.-it has been considered penal." Id. at 96.-
56. It has been argued that a mere rational relationship standard is insuffi-
cient since "virtually any statute may be rationally related to a nonpunitive
goal." See Note, supra note 42, at 1674. See also Trop, 356 U.S. at 86 (Chief Jus-
tice Warren argued, as an example, that a statute providing for the imprison-
ment of bank robbers could not be rendered nonpenal by "labeling it a
regulation of banks or by arguing that there is a rational connection between
safeguarding banks and imprisoning bank robbers. The inquiry must be di-
rected to substance.").
57. Nixon, 433 U.S. at 475.
58. Id. at 482. This approach is rooted in the idea of Justice Goldberg's
seventh punishment test of "whether it appears excessive in relation to the al-
ternative purpose assigned." Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. at 169. But Justice
Brennan's application of the less burdensome alternatives test to the punish-
ment analysis "may well prove to be the major development in this area of the
law since the decision in Cummings itself." See Lehmann, supra note 12, at
1009.
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record evinces a congressional intent to punish,"5 9 serves as an
interpretive aid in applying the functional test.60 Although the
Court is justifiably hesitant to use legislative history to invali-
date a statute,61 the Court has approved its use in determining
whether a given sanction is punitive or regulatory.62 For exam-
ple, in United States v. Lovett,63 Justice Black exhaustively in-
vestigated the legislative record in determining that the
congressional purpose in prohibiting the use of appropriated
funds to pay the salaries of the three men was to "purge" them
from the government payroll, not merely to alter their mode of
compensation.6 4 Likewise, in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez,65
59. Nixon, 433 U.S. at 478.
60. See Lehmann, supra note 12, at 1007 (noting that "[t]he third test of
punishment is no test at all," but rather "consists of the technique... [of] ju-
dicial scrutiny of the legislative record to determine motive").
61. Among the criticisms of the use of legislative history as an interpreta-
tive device to strike down statutes are that rarely is there a single legislative
purpose, much less one that can be ascertained from an investigation of the
record, and that such an inquiry not only is futile because the legislature can
simply reenact the statute with a "laundered" history, but also constitutes im-
proper judicial interference with the legislative function. See Clark, supra note
42, at 441-44. See also Brest, Palmer v. Thompson: An Approach to the Problem
of Unconstitutional Legislative Motive, 1971 SUP. CT. REv. 95, 116-18 (arguing
that the Court should invalidate statutes in cases where the record indicates
that weight was given to illicit objectives, unless the decisionmaker can prove
that it was not determinative of the outcome); Lehmann, supra note 12, at 826
(suggesting that the unascertainability problem could be lessened by the
Court's establishing guidelines regarding the types of evidence it will consider
probative of legislative purpose); Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 43 Hanv. L.
REV. 863 (1930) (concentrating on the principal difficulty of the unas-
certainability of legislative motive).
62. In United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968), the Supreme Court
sanctioned the use of legislators' statements "in a very limited and well-defined
class of cases where the very nature of the constitutional question requires an
inquiry into legislative purpose." Id. at 383-84 n.30. In addition to Lovett, the
Court cited with approval two non-bill attainder cases in which the inquiry
"was for the same limited purpose as in the bill of attainder decisions-i.e., to
determine whether the statutes under review were punitive in nature." Id.
One of these cases was Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 168 (1963). See
infra notes 65-67 and accompanying text. The other was Trop v. Dulles, 356
U.S. 86 (1957), in which the Court struck down a statute providing for the loss
of citizenship by deserters because it inflicted cruel and unusual punishment.
But, although Justice Brennan's concurrence made reference to the legislative
history of the statute in determining that it was punitive, id. at 107, the major-
ity decision did not. Acknowledging that the question of whether a statute con-
stitutes punishment "normally depends on the evident purpose of the
legislature," id. at 96, Chief Justice Warren relied not on the record of the legis-
lation to declare it punitive, but rather on the absence of any "other legislative
purpose the statute could serve," id. at 97. Thus Trop sanctions Nixon's second
test but not, as the O'Brien footnote implied, its third test of legislative history.
63. 328 U.S. 303 (1946).
64. Id. at 313-14.
65. 372 U.S. 144 (1963).
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Justice Goldberg set forth a seven-part punishment test 66 but
declined to apply it "because the objective manifestations of
congressional purpose indicate that the provisions in question
can only be interpreted as punitive."67 Thus in these cases the
Court found no support in the record for the government's con-
tention that the challenged enactment had a nonpunitive pur-
pose. The floor statements cited by the district court in Doe,
however, suggest that the proponents of the Solomon Amend-
ment were motivated by a desire to establish fair eligibility
standards for student aid and, most importantly, to encourage
registration. 68 But just as one may not conclude from a cursory
examination of the floor statements quoted by the district court
that the Solomon Amendment inflicts punishment, neither do
these suggested alternative purposes become nonpunitive
merely by being labeled as such by the legislation's propo-
nents.69 Indeed, application of the functional test to the Solo-
mon Amendment reveals that neither establishing student aid
qualifications nor encouraging draft registration would consti-
tute a valid nonpunitive purpose of an inescapable Solomon
Amendment.
First, the district court properly rejected the government's
contention that the Solomon Amendment was valid as an at-
tempt "to promote a just allocation of scarce aid dollars."70 The
government's argument, necessarily implying that registering
for the draft is a valid qualification for receiving student aid, is
similar to the argument for the loyalty oath in Cummings. In
Cummings, the Court rejected the argument that expressing
words of sympathy for the Confederacy or entering or leaving
the state to avoid being drafted into the United States Army af-
fected one's fitness to teach or preach, 71 concluding that the
oath "was required to reach the person, not the calling."72 Al-
though the Court later retreated from this position by uphold-
ing an analogous "retrospective" loyalty oath as a reasonable
qualification for municipal employment,73 the Brown decision
66. See supra note 41.
67. 372 U.S. at 169. Justice Goldberg noted the absence of any considera-
tion of alternative nonpunitive purposes in the record. Id. at 182.
68. See Doe I, 557 F. Supp. at 945. See also infra note 99.
69. See Trop, 356 U.S. at 94 (Cabinet committee report stating that the pro-
posed legislation "technically is not a penal law" does not affect Court's punish-
ment analysis).
70. Doe I, 557 F. Supp. at 944.
71. Cummings, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 319. See supra note 18.
72. Cummings, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 320.
73. Garner v. Board of Pub. Works, 341 U.S. 716 (1951). The Court upheld a
statute barring any person who refused to swear that he had not, within the
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signified a return to the increased means/ends scrutiny of
Cummings .74
Another line of attainder cases that seems to lend support
to the argument that violating the registration law is a legiti-
mate ground for denying aid must also be distinguished. In
Hawker v. New York,7 5 a nineteenth century case which appar-
ently has survived Brown,7 6 the Court upheld a state statute
prohibiting convicted felons from practicing medicine. The
Court reasoned that a legislature could condition the receipt of
a professional license on past actions if those actions were suf-
ficiently probative of the applicant's bad character.7 7 Applying
this rationale to Doe, one notes that failing to register also is a
felony.7 8 Hawker is distinguishable, however, because a doctor
affected by the disqualifying statute was granted the opportu-
nity for a judicial trial, albeit before the legislature imposed the
additional burden.7 9 Doe and his fellow plaintiffs, on the other
hand, have not been convicted, or even accused, of failing to
preceding five years, advocated or belonged to an organization that advocated
the violent overthrow of the government from employment with the city of Los
Angeles. The Court found that such a qualification was not punishment, but
merely "establish[ed] reasonable qualifications for a vocational pursuit with
the necessary effect of disqualifying some persons presently engaged in it." Id.
at 723.
74. In Brown the Court rejected the claim that Congress had intended
merely to set up a general rule keeping those likely to incite political violence
out of union office, holding that the challenged statute could not use "Commu-
nist Party" as a shorthand criterion for those persons possessing the targeted
characteristics. Brown, 381 U.S. at 455-56. Note that compared to the relation-
ship between Communist Party membership and potentially disruptive union
activity, the relationship between nonregistration and one's qualifications to re-
ceive educational assistance would seem relatively tenuous.
75. 170 U.S. 189 (1898).
76. Recent lower court decisions have reaffirmed the validity of Hawker,
even after Brown. See, e.g., Cody v. United States, 460 F.2d 34 (8th Cir. 1972)
(upholding firearms restrictions applicable to convicted felons against bill of at-
tainder challenge); United States v. Donofrio, 450 F.2d 1054 (5th Cir. 1971)
(same).
77. The Court determined that the legislature could require good character
as a condition to practicing medicine and that "[w]hatever is ordinarily con-
nected with bad character, or indicative of it, may be prescribed by the legisla-
ture as conclusive evidence thereof." Hawker, 170 U.S. at 195. Prohibiting
convicted felons from certain activities upon this basis is reasonable since "[i]t
is not, as a rule, the good people who commit crime." Id. at 196. See also De-
Veau v. Braisted, 363 U.S. 144 (1960) (upholding section of New York Water-
front Commission Act prohibiting unions from collecting dues if any officer had
been convicted of a felony and not been pardoned).
78. Failure to register is punishable by up to five years' imprisonment, a
$10,000 fine, or both. 50 U.S.C. app. § 462(a) (1976).
79. 170 U.S. at 189-90. For an argument that being penalized based on the
result of an adjudication held at a different time and for a different purpose de-
nies one of any meaningful hearing, see Lehmann, supra note 12, at 906-09.
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register.80 Therefore, even though Congress may have the au-
thority to cut off student aid to convicted nonregistrants, the
Solomon Amendment is not justifiable merely on the theory
that it sets forth a valid eligibility standard for receipt of stu-
dent aid.8 1
The second suggested nonpunitive rationale, encouraging
registration, also fails to prevent an inescapable Solomon
Amendment from inflicting punishment. Of course, even an in-
escapable Solomon Amendment would encourage registration
to the extent that young men mindful of the potential aid dis-
qualification would be more likely to register promptly upon
reaching the age of eighteen. But, as Chief Justice Warren
stressed in Brown, adding a purely deterrent function does not
remedy an otherwise punitive sanction. 82 Thus, the limited de-
80. The district court noted that "this decision should not be interpreted as
passing on the constitutionality of any law that would deny federal financial
assistance to students after conviction for nonregistration." Doe I, 557 F. Supp.
at 939.
81. For an analogous attempt to disqualify students from receiving
financial aid based on criminal behavior, see 20 U.S.C. § 1088f(a) (1976). Origi-
nally enacted in 1968 because of congressional alarm over "student unrest...
outwardly evidenced by rioting, trespass and forceful interference with [col-
lege] administration," S. REP. No. 1387, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 19-20, reprinted in
1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & An. NEws 4035, 4053, this subsection imposed a two-
year financial aid disqualification on any student upon a determination by
school officials that the student had been
convicted ... of any crime . . . which involved the use of ... force,
disruption, or seizure of [campus] property... to prevent officials or
students.., from engaging in their duties or pursuing their studies,
and that such crime was of a serious nature and contributed to a sub-
stantial disruption of the administration of the institution ....
20 U.S.C. § 1088f(a) (1976). A companion provision imposed the same disquali-
fication for a willful refusal to obey a "lawful regulation or order" of the institu-
tion. 20 U.S.C. § 1088f(b) (1976). These provisions were deleted by Congress in
its 1980 amendment of the Higher Education Act. See Education Amendments
of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-374, 94 Stat. 1367, 1448-49 (codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1091).
Even before its deletion, courts were often less than enthusiastic about ap-
proving aid disqualifications resulting from § 1088f(a) or its predecessor. See,
e.g., Green v. Dumke, 480 F.2d 624 (9th Cir. 1973) (ordering aid restored to stu-
dents on the grounds of procedural due procss); Rasche v. Board of Trustees,
353 F. Supp. 973, 977 (N.D. IM. 1972) (finding § 1088f(a) unconstitutionally vague
and overbroad but noting that the court did not "[intend] to imply that Con-
gress may not properly condition or withdraw federal aid to students under ap-
propriately precise standards"). See also Corporation of Haverford College v.
Reeher, 329 F. Supp. 1196, 1209-10 (E.D. Pa. 1971) (striking down portion of a
similar state student aid disqualification statute but upholding subsection that
denied aid to convicted felons).
82. Brown, 381 U.S. at 458. Lehmann has criticized the Nixon decision for
ignoring Brown's redefinition of the "possible purposes of punishment" by
looking for only retributive, but not deterrent, motivation in the legislative rec-
ord. Lehmann, supra note 12, at 1008. Presumably, though, not all preventive
or rehabilitative statutes necessarily would constitute punishment, even if they
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terrent value of an inescapable section 1113 does not prevent it
from illegitimately punishing those forever disqualified from re-
ceiving aid.83 This conclusion depends, however, on the district
court's assumption that section 1113 is inescapable,8 4 an as-
sumption that merits careful reconsideration.
C. THE EFFECT OF ESCAPABLI ON ATrAINDER ANALYSis
1. Escapability of the Solomon Amendment
In concluding that the Solomon Amendment is ines-
capable, the district court relied on a plausible, but overly nar-
row, reading of the statute. Under the terms of section 1113,
anyone required to register under section 3 of the Iilitary Se-
lective Service Act who "fails to do so in accordance with any
proclamation issued under such section" is ineligible for title
IV assistance.8 5 Although section 3 does not prescribe any re-
gistration deadline,86 President Carter's Proclamation No. 4771,
which reinstituted registration, required young men to register
within thirty days of their eighteenth birthdays.8 Because
Proclamation No. 4771 was issued under section 3, the district
court read the Solomon Amendment as incorporating the proc-
lamation's thirty-day requirement. Thus the court interpreted
the Amendment as preventing anyone who fails to register
might have some collateral deterrent or retributive effects. A statute whose
dominant purpose is preventive, such as prohibiting convicted felons from own-
ing guns, see supra note 76, would constitute valid regulation so long as the dis-
qualifying criteria are related closely enough to the proscribed activity.
Likewise, such rehabilitative sanctions as civil commitment, which generally
attaches to status or mental condition rather than to prohibited conduct, do not
constitute punishment since "retribution and deterrence are not effectively
served." Clark, supra note 42, at 489-90.
83. See supra text accompanying note 55. For a similar argument that the
suggested alternative purpose in Mendoza-Martinez, improving troop moral by
expatriating draft evaders remaining abroad, was purely deterrent and retribu-
tive in function, see Clark, supra note 42, at 461-63.
84. See supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text.
85. 50 U.S.C-.A app. § 462(f) (1) (1983).
86. Section 3 of the Military Selective Service Act states:
Except as otherwise provided in this title ... it shall be the duty of
every male citizen of the United States, and every other male person
residing in the United States, who, on the day or days fixed for the first
or any subsequent registration, is between the ages of eighteen and
twenty-six, to present himself for and submit to registration at such
time or times and place or places, and in such manner, as shall be de-
termined by proclamation of the President and by rules and regula-
tions prescribed hereunder.
Military Selective Service Act, § 3, 50 U.S.C. § 453(a) (Supp. V 1981). -
87. See Proclamation No. 4771, 3 C.F.R. 82 (1980), reprinted in 50 U.S.C.
app. § 453 at 887-88 (Supp. V 1981).
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
within a month of reaching eighteen from ever qualifying for
aid.
Although the district court's interpretation is defensible,
the court more accurately could have determined section 1113
to be ambiguous on its face and turned to other interpretive
aids such as the implementing regulations and legislative his-
tory.88 Furthermore, although the district court's interpretation
arguably would be required had section 1113 referred to those
who "failed" to register, the statute uses the present tense
"fails," suggesting two other possible interpretations. First, the
statute could be read so that the disqualification applied pro-
spectively to those missing the thirty-day deadline after the
Act's passage, but not retrospectively to those who already had
failed to meet the deadline.89 Alternatively, the use of the pres-
ent tense could indicate that section 1113 only disqualified men
who fail to register before applying for financial aid. Under this
interpretation, failing to meet the technical thirty-day deadline
would not permanently disqualify a student from receiving aid.
Under such an interpretation the sanction would be fully
escapable.
Because the statute was ambiguous, the district court had
a responsibility to search for "that interpretation which can
most fairly be said to be imbedded in the statute, in the sense
of being most harmonious with its scheme and with the general
purposes that Congress manifested."90 In such searches, courts
normally defer to the implementing agency's interpretation.91
The Department of Education, the agency charged with imple-
88. The government suggested that the "in accordance with" language
should be read "as simply requiring registration in the manner required by any
proclamation or regulation." Jurisdictional Statement at 12, Selective Serv.
Sys. v. Minnesota Pub. Interest Research Group. It also cited subsection (f) (4),
which requires that the Secretary of Education give any student facing a poten-
tial denial of student aid for failure to comply with the registration require-
ments "notice of the proposed denial and ... a suitable period (of not less
than thirty days) after such notice to provide the Secretary with information
and materials establishing that he has complied with the registration require-
ment under section 3." 50 U.S.CA. app. § 462(f) (4) (1983). The government ar-
gued that the most logical interpretation of this provision is that students who
have been notified that they face a loss of student aid have thirty days in which
to remedy the situation by registering. Jurisdictional Statement at 13, Selective
Serv. Sys. v. Minnesota Pub. Interest Research Group.
89. This interpretation might also be read to allow those missing the dead-
line before passage to qualify for aid by registering within thirty days of the
amendment's becoming law.
90. FBI v. Abramson, 456 U.S. 615, 625 n.7 (1982) (quoting NLRB v. Lion Oil
Co., 352 U.S. 282, 297 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring and dissenting)).
91. See, e.g., Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16 (1965) ("When faced with a
problem of statutory construction, this Court shows great deference to the in-
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menting section 1113, construed the statute to disqualify only
those who failed to register before applying for financial aid,9 2
making the sanction escapable. Moreover, the floor debate in
both Houses indicated that the dominant purpose of the Solo-
mon Amendment was to encourage registration, not to punish
those who, for whatever reason, had failed to register on time.93
In fact, in the only speech in either House which specifically
addressed the escapability issue, Senator Stennis indicated his
understanding that the Solomon Amendment was not a punish-
ment of past failure to register.
terpretation given the statute by the officers or agency charged with its
administration.").
92. In the explanation that accompanied the regulations implementing the
Solomon Amendment, Secretary of Education Terrence Bell stated: "Moreover,
consistent with the statutory intent to encourage registration, under these regu-
lations any nonregistrant who was required to register but did not may still
qualify for aid in the future payment periods if he registers with the Selective
Service and complies with the statement and verification requirements." 48
Fed. Reg. 15,580 (1983) (emphasis added). For the text of the Department's reg-
ulation providing for late registration, see supra note 30. In granting the per-
manent injunction, the district court did not explain its conclusion that the
regulation was void as conflicting with the plain meaning of the statute, Doe II,
No. 3-82 Civ. 1670 at 4, although it apparently followed the approach outlined in
the text.
In its opinion granting the temporary injunction, however, the district court
analogized the government's argument that nonregistrants could qualify by
registering late to the one rejected by the Court in Cummings that one could
escape the sanctions imposed by Missouri's constitution by swearing to the ex-
purgatory oath. Doe I, 557 F. Supp. at 942 (citing Cummings, 71 U.S. (4 Wall) at
327). This comparison is unpersuasive. In Cummings the oath did not provide
a valid escape because it required persons to swear not only that they would be
loyal, but also that they had not committed certain specified actions. Since a
person who had committed such actions could not truthfully swear to the oath,
it did not provide an effective escape. Conversely, the Department's regulation,
if valid, does provide a bona fide escape from the disqualification imposed by
§ 1113, even though the late registrant could face criminal liability under § 462.
See infra text accompanying note 97.
One should note, however, that the regulations were not printed in their
final form until April 11, 1983, a month after the court granted the temporary
injunction on March 10. Doe I, 557 F. Supp. 937. The proposed regulations also
contained an escape provision, but their lack of finality during the trial may ac-
count for the relative lack of serious consideration that the escape provision re-
ceived at that point.
93. See, e.g., 128 CONG. REC. S4943-44 (daily ed. May 12, 1982) (statement of
Sen. Hayakawa) ('This amendment seeks not only to increase compliance with
the registration requirement but also to insure the most fair and just usage of
Federal education benefits."); 128 CONG. REc. H4757 (daily ed. July 28, 1982)
(statement of Rep. Whitehurst) ("I think [the Solomon Amendment] sends a
powerful message, and I think it will act as a veritable tonic on those who have
not seen fit to register so far."); id. at 4770 (statement of Rep. Stratton) ("It is a
method of trying to prevent violation of the law and also to encourage young
people... to comply with the law. It may not catch all of the violators, but it is
certainly going to prevent those who are violating the law from taking taxpay-
ers' money.").
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I thought of the proposition here where some youngster might have
overlooked signing up or might have misunderstood it or had not been
correctly informed, but he is not going to be penalized for that because
he still has complete control of the situation. All he will have to do is
just to comply with the law, and that will make him eligible so far as
this prohibition or restriction is concerned.9 4
Both the agency interpretation and Senator Stennis's remarks
indicate that the third possible interpretation, that section 1113
disqualifies only those who fail to register as of the time they
apply for aid, best effects the congressional purpose.95
The district court contended that the suggestion that the
sanctions imposed by the Solomon Amendment may be es-
caped by registering late "ignores the fact that males born after
January 1, 1963 must register within 30 days of their eighteenth
birthday or be subjected to prosecution for late registration." 96
Whether the criminal sanction of the Selective Service Act is
escapable, however, is irrelevant to the issue of the escapability
of section 1113's restriction on financial aid.9 7 Rather, to resolve
the ambiguity found in the Solomon Amendment, the court
should have looked to the congressional purpose of encourag-
ing registration, as did the Department of Education in promul-
gating its regulations, to interpret the statute as permitting late
registrants to qualify for aid.
94. 128 CONG. Rac. S4945 (daily ed. May 12, 1982). Though statements of a
single legislator should not assume undue weight in statutory interpretation,
the lack of disagreement with Senator Stennis's implicit acknowledgment of
the escapability of the Solomon Amendment provides additional support for
the contention that such was the congressional intent.
95. Although the district court cited statements by members of Congress
in order to illustrate a punitive intent, see supra note 39, the statements basi-
cally express the congressional outrage that young men who refused to register
still expected federal assistance. Because late registration would end this con-
cern, the cited statements are not inconsistent with an intent to make the Solo-
mon Amendment escapable.
96. Doe I, 557 F. Supp. at 942.
97. This is because potential criminal defendants are afforded certain
other protections not available to students facing aid disqualification under the
Solomon Amendment. Courts have acknowledged that a culpably criminal in-
tent is required for convictions under § 462 of the Selective Service Act, see U.S.
v. Klotz, 500 F.2d 580 (8th Cir. 1974), and, not surprisingly, no one has ever been
prosecuted for registering late, see Brief for Appellants at 17 n.7, Selective Serv.
Sys. v. Minnesota Pub. Interest Research Group. As Representative Solomon
acknowledged, many of those who have failed to register have done so uninten-
tionally. 128 CONG. REc. H4757 (daily ed. July 28, 1982) (statement of Rep. Solo-
mon). Hence, since § 1113 contains neither an intent requirement nor a
provision for leniency comparable to that afforded by prosecutorial discretion
in the criminal context, the absence of an express escape provision § 462 does
not indicate an intent to make § 1113 inescapable.
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2. Incorporating Escapability Into the Punishment Analysis
Some pre-Broun attainder cases indicated that the pres-
ence of an escapability feature automatically immunized a stat-
ute from an attainder challenge. In Douds, the Court
concluded that section 9(h) of the National Labor Relations Act
of 1947 did not impose punishment because those affected
"[were] free to serve as union officers if at any time they re-
nounce[d] the allegiances which constituted a bar to signing
the affidavit in the past."9 8 Likewise, in SACB, the Court up-
held the requirement of section 7(a) of the Subversive Activi-
ties Control Act that all Communist-action organizations
register with the Attorney General.9 9 Justice Frankfurter rea-
soned that a statute does not attaint when those subject to its
requirements "can escape regulation merely by altering the
course of their present activities."' 00 Under the rule embodied
in these cases, the implementing regulations of the Solomon
Amendment would appear to preclude a finding of attainder be-
cause they offer nonregistrants essentially the same opportu-
nity to escape by registering late as that afforded Communists
in Douds. As noted earlier, however, it is unclear to what ex-
tent Douds and SACB remain good law after Brown.
In Brown, Chief Justice Warren implicitly recognized that
an escapable sanction may still constitute a bill of attainder.10'
Actually, he need not even have addressed the issue since the
challenged statute, prohibiting anyone who had been a Com-
munist Party member within the past five years from holding
union office, acted retrospectively and was not immediately es-
capable. 102 Nonetheless, the Chief Justice acknowledged that
the Court did not interpret Douds and SACB "to have set up
98. Douds, 339 U.S. at 414.
99. See supra note 24.
100. SACB, 367 U.S. at 88.
101. 381 U.S. at 457 n.32. See also Davis, United States v. Lovett and the At-
tainder Bogy in Modern Legislation, 1950 WAsH. U.L.Q. 13, 15, 41; Wormuth,
Legislative Disqualifications as Bills of Attainder, 4 VAD. L. REV. 603, 607 n.24
and accompanying text (1951); California Note, supra note 15, at 240; Note, The
Constitutional Prohibition of Bills of Attainder: A Waning Guaranty of Judi-
cial Trial 63 YALE L.Q. 844, 851-52 (1954). For the most recent, as well as com-
prehensive, discussion rejecting the prospective/retrospective dichotomy as
one irrelevant to a proper attainder analysis, see Lehmann, supra note 12, at
835-46, 950-58. But see Note, supra note 29, at 239-43 (arguing that bills of attain-
der, properly defined, apply only to "fixed groups," while sanctions attaching to
"shifting groups," those that either apply totally prospectively or offer a bona
fide escape, are nonpunitive "qualifications").
102. Brown, 381 U.S. at 458. In fact, Chief Justice Warren used this point to
distinguish Douds. Id.
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inescapability as an absolute prerequisite to a finding of attain-
der."103 Thus, the Court cannot rely on the reasoning in those
two cases that a purported escape provision is itself dispositive
of either the punishment or specificity issues.10 4 Chief Justice
Warren's statement that escapability is merely probative, not
determinative, of whether a statute inflicts punishment indi-
cates that the Court will look beyond the mere presence to the
nature of the escapability provision.105 Brown does not, unfor-
tunately, offer any specific guidance as to what criteria such an
analysis should involve.
Applying the punishment test outlined above is the best
way to evaluate the impact of a statute's escapability. That is,
in order to remedy the constitutional defect of an otherwise
suspect statute, an escapability provision must give the statute
an alternative nonpunitive purpose that would not otherwise be
present. Adding an escapability clause would not make regis-
103. Id. at 457 n.32.
104. Recall that since § 7(a) in SACB attached not to specific named organi-
zations but to those fitting the statute's definition of a "Communist-action or-
ganization," Justice Frankfurter indicated that its escapability destroyed the
specificity as well as the punishment element. See supra note 24. Since § 504
in Brown did specify the Communist Party by name, Chief Justice Warren did
not have occasion to reexamine the effect of escapability on the specificity of a
statute which, like the Solomon Amendment, attaches to past actions. Rather,
he merely noted that in SACB escapability "was considered only as one factor
tending to show that the Act in question was not directed at a specific group of
persons but rather set forth a generally applicable definition." Brown, 381 U.S.
at 457 n.32.
It probably would be best, however, to admit that escapability has no real
bearing on the specificity issue. As one commentator has noted, "[t]he key
concern [of the specificity requirement] is not what the intended victim of an
alleged attainder might do to avoid a legislative sanction but rather whether
the descriptive apparatus contained within the text of the statute in question
ensures that the petitioner is indeed one of the intended victims." Lehmann,
supra note 12, at 896-97. As applied in Doe, the presence of an escapability op-
tion does not obscure the fact that nonregistrant students are the intended
"victims" of § 1113. The real question, rather, is the impact such an escape
clause has on the punishment issue.
105. Of course, to have any chance of defeating an attainder claim, a pur-
ported escape clause must offer an effective means of avoiding the threatened
sanction; the expurgatory oath in Cummings provided no such opportunity be-
cause those "embraced by the supposed enactments would be incapable of tak-
ing the oath prescribed." See Cummings, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 329; see also
discussion at supra note 18. But a statute that permits its potential victims to
escape only at an unreasonably high cost may also be invalid. Arguably, the
Brown Court would have found that the escape provision in Douds did not
remedy the constitutional defect because the price of the escape, in terms of
impinging on first amendment political associational rights, was simply too
high. See L TaiE, AmERicAN CoNSTrrmoNAL LAw 496-99 (1978) (discussing
the importance of the bill of attainder clause in protecting first amendment
rights against politically-motivated attacks).
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tering for the draft a more reasonable qualification for the re-
ceipt of student aid,106 but it would legitimate the purpose of
encouraging registration. An escapable Solomon Amendment
not only deters those turning eighteen from breaking the law,
but also encourages men who failed to register before their
thirty-day deadlines to qualify for aid by registering late. Fi-
nally, this interpretation satisfies the heightened rationality
test of Nixon107 because denying financial aid is a less burden-
some-and more efficient-means of encouraging registration
than the alternative of singling out nonregistrants for criminal
prosecution.108
The Supreme Court has recognized the legitimacy of simi-
lar coercive purposes in analogous cases not involving bills of
attainder. For example, the Court declined to apply the sixth
amendment jury trial guarantee to civil contempt cases in
which the release of those imprisoned is conditioned on their
willingness to testify.109 Although fine and imprisonment nec-
essarily involve some measure of retribution and deterrence," 0
when imposed to compel testimony they are used "not to vindi-
cate the public interest but as coercive sanctions to compel the
contemnor to do what the law made it his duty to do.""' Simi-
larly, in Fullilove v. Klutznick112 the Court rejected an equal
protection challenge to a minority business enterprise provi-
106. See supra notes 70-81 and accompanying text.
107. See supra text accompanying notes 57-58.
108. Criminal prosecutions against those who fail to register is not only a
less efficient method of encouraging registration, but it also imposes a dispro-
portionately heavy burden on those few who are singled out for prosecution.
Moreover, the Selective Service "passive enforcement" policy of prosecuting
only those nonregistrants who make their status known raises a difficult first
amendment issue. Compare United States v. Wayte, 710 F.2d 1385 (9th Cir.
1983) (finding no selective prosecution problem in passive enforcement ap-
proach) with United States v. Schmucker, 721 F.2d 1046 (6th Cir. 1983) (re-
manding for a full evidentiary hearing on nonregistrant's selective prosecution
claim).
109. See Clark, supra note 42, at 488-89 (discussion of civil contempt as one
category of sanctions that may be nonpunitive).
The court has reasoned that those subject to contempt carry "the keys of
their prison in their own pockets." Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S. 364, 368
(1966) (quoting In re Nevitt, 117 F. 448, 461 (8th Cir. 1902)). Since the justifica-
tion for deeming coercive imprisonment to be nonpunitive is that it may be
avoided at any time, however, the Court found that the court orders "Were im-
proper insofar as they imposed sentences that extended beyond the cessation
of the grand jury's inquiry." Id. at 371. Note the analogy to the failure of the
expurgatory oath in Cummings to serve as an effective escape. See supra note
105.
110. See Shillitani, 384 U.S. at 370.
111. Penfleld Co. v. S.E.C., 330 U.S. 585, 590 (1947).
112. 448 U.S. 448 (1980) (plurality opinion).
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sion requiring that grantees of public works funding use at
least ten percent of the money to procure services or supplies
from minority-owned businesses." 3 There the purpose was not
to establish qualifications for contractors, but rather to promote
the independent goal of discouraging racial discrimination.114
The Court explicitly acknowledged that
Congress has frequently employed the Spending Power to further
broad policy objectives by conditioning receipt of federal moneys [sic]
upon compliance by the recipient with federal statutory and adminis-
trative directives. This Court has repeatedly upheld against constitu-
tional challenge the use of this technique to induce governments and
private parties to cooperate voluntarily with federal policy.1 15
All men born on or after January 1, 1960, have a legal obli-
gation to register with the Selective Service.116 Thus the gov-
ernment, without running afoul of the bill of attainder clause,
may deny benefits to those who fail to do so as long as the dis-
qualifying condition is escapable and the government has a le-
gitimate nonpunitive purpose in encouraging such escape.
Although the Solomon Amendment would be vulnerable to a
bill of attainder challenge had it not given nonregistrants the
chance to avoid its sanctions by registering late, the Court
should interpret section 1113 so as to uphold the Department of
Education's regulations that provides for such an escape.
Under this interpretation the Solomon Amendment is not a bill
of attainder because it encourages registration and thereby fur-
thers a legitimate coercive, rather than merely retributive or
deterrent, purpose.
I1. FF AMENDMENT SELF-INCRIMINATION
In addition to finding that the penalty imposed by the Solo-
mon Amendment constituted a bill of attainder, the district
court held that the method of enforcing section 1113-requiring
financial aid applicants to submit statements of registration
compliance" 7-violated the fifth amendment privilege against
113. Id. at 454.
114. Id. at 478. Similarly, conditioning receipt of student aid on registration
encourages compliance with the registration law and, many would say, one's
basic duty as a citizen.
115. Id. at 474. Such a coercive use of conditioned benefits need not be lim-
ited to enforcing only constitutional guarantees. The Court, for example, has
permitted the conditioning of federal highway funding to the states on their
compliance with the Hatch Act. Oklahoma v. United States Civil Serv.
Comm'n, 330 U.S. 127 (1947).
116. Proclamation No. 4771, 3 C.F.R. 82 (1980), reprinted in 50 U.S.C. app.
§ 453 at 887-88 (Supp. V 1981).
117. The certification of the Solomon Amendment requirement is set forth
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self-incrimination.n 8 The district court analogized Doe to
Marchetti v. United States," 9 in which the Supreme Court re-
versed Marchetti's conviction for failure to register with the In-
ternal Revenue Service (IRS) as an individual liable for a
special occupational tax on gambling.120 Because the IRS made
lists of those paying the tax available to law enforcement agen-
cies,12' complying with the registration and tax provisions sub-
at 50 U.S.C.A. app. § 462(f) (2) (1983). See also supra note 1. The model state-
ment of registration compliance contained in the Department of Education reg-
ulations requires aid applicants to certify either that they have registered or
that they are exempt from registration; it does not ask students to incriminate
themselves directly by certifying that they violated the registration law. See 34
C.F.R. § 668.25 (1983).
118. Doe II, No. 3-82 Civ. 1670 at 5. The fifth amendment provides: "No per-
son... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against him-
self." U.S. CONsT. amend. V. For the history of the privilege against self-
incrimination, both in England and the United States, see L. LEvY, ORIGINS OF
THE FIFrH AMENDMENT. THE RIGHT AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION (1968).
The district court noted that the fifth amendment privilege is not limited to
criminal cases but "extends to administrative proceedings like the one envi-
sioned by this statute." Doe I, 557 F. Supp. at 947. Although by its terms the
fifth amendment applies only in criminal cases, the Supreme Court has ac-
knowledged that to protect the rights of the accused at trial, the privilege must
be extended to witnesses in "any other proceeding ... where the answers
might incriminate him in future criminal proceedings." Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414
U.S. 70, 77 (1973) (applying privilege to grand jury hearings).
119. 390 U.S. 39 (1968).
120. Id. at 40-42. The statute involved in Marchetti imposed an excise tax of
10% on all wagers accepted, with certain exceptions, and an additional occupa-
tional tax of $50 on those subject to taxation. The tax provisions were supple-
mented by a requirement that gamblers submit an IRS registration form
indicating whether they were engaged in the business of accepting wagers and
requesting other information about their operations. Id. at 42. The Court rec-
ognized the validity of taxing unlawful activites; the issue before it was
whether the means of enforcing the statute were "in this situation, consistent
with the limitations created by the privilege against self-incrimination guaran-
teed by the Fifth Amendment." Id. at 44. While noting that the registration
and wagering tax provisions were not themselves unconstitutional, the Court
held that Marchetti properly asserted his fifth amendment privilege by not
complying with them and that such an assertion provides a complete defense
to a prosecution for failure to register and pay the occupational tax. Id. at 60-
61.
See also Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6 (1969) (plea of self-incrimination
a complete defense in prosecution for noncompliance with transfer tax provi-
sions of Marihuana Tax Act); Haynes v. United States, 390 U.S. 85 (1968) (con-
viction for possession of illegal firearm not registered under National Firearms
Act reversed since the registration requirement gave rise to real and apprecia-
ble hazards of incrimination); Grosso v. United States, 390 U.S. 62 (1968) (re-
versing conviction under gambling tax provisions involved in Marchetti);
Albertson v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 382 U.S. 70 (1965) (order requir-
ing registration of Communist Party members inconsistent with fifth amend-
ment because, despite purported immunity provision that admission of
membership was not per se criminal violation, it could be used as an investiga-
tory lead).
121. Marchetti, 390 U.S. at 48.
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jected gamblers to "substantial and 'real,' not merely trifling or
imaginary, hazards of incrimination"122 under various federal,
state, and local anti-gambling laws.123 The verification provi-
sion of section 1113 similarly stipulates that educational institu-
tions may be required to provide the Secretary of Education
and the Director of the Selective Service System with lists of
those students submitting statements of registration compli-
ance.124 The district court, citing Marchetti, thus concluded
that "plaintiffs' identification of themselves as nonregistrants
could incriminate them or provide a significant link in the chain
of evidence tending to establish their guilt" and that these risks
"were obvious."125
The court also held that the threatened denial of student
aid benefits satisfied the compulsion required for a successful
fifth amendment objection.126 Indeed, the Supreme Court ac-
knowledged that "direct economic sanctions and imprisonment
are not the only penalties capable of forcing ... self-incrimina-
tion."'127 For example, in Garrity v. New Jersey,128 the Court
held that a police officer's confession made in the course of an
attorney general's ticket-fixing investigation was coerced be-
cause state law required removal of public employees who re-
122. Id. at 43, quoted in Doe I, 557 F. Supp. at 947.
123. Id. at 42-48.
124. 50 U.S.C. A. app. § 462(f) (3) (1983).
125. Doe I, 557 F. Supp. at 947-48. The Supreme Court has ruled that the
privilege against self-incrimination "not only extends to answers that would in
themselves support a conviction... but likewise embraces those which would
furnish a link in the chain of evidence needed to prosecute." Hoffman v. United
States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951) (reversing criminal contempt conviction of rack-
eteer who had refused to answer questions regarding his present occupation
and connection with fugitive witness).
Although the analysis below concludes that § 1113 lacks the requisite ele-
ment of compulsion, a strong argument also can be made that it fails to present
a substantial hazard of incrimination. The Solomon Amendment indicates that
the Department of Education and Selective Service will have access only to
lists of those students who have actually submitted statements of compliance.
See supra note 124 and accompanying text. Presumably, those students who
fail to submit such forms will be denied aid on the institutional level, never giv-
ing a federal agency a chance to track down the potential violator even if it
wanted to. Moreover, in the event that a rebellious nonregistrant chose to indi-
cate his illegal status on the certification form, he likely would have voluntarily
waived his fifth amendment privilege. See Garner v. United States, 424 U.S. 648
(1976) (taxpayer who specified his occupation as "professional gambler" on his
Form 1040 tax return foreclosed from invoking privilege in subsequent criminal
prosecution).
126. Doe I, 557 F. Supp. at 948-49.
127. Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, 431 U.S. 801, 806 (1977) (invalidating New
York statute that divested attorney of political office for refusing to waive im-
munity when subpoenaed by grand jury).
128. 385 U.S. 493 (1967).
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fused to testify in cases relating to their employment.129
Similarly, in a decision announced the same day as Garrity,
the Court in Spevack v. Klein13 0 found that an attorney could
not be disbarred for refusing to produce financial records or to
testify regarding them.131 It held that the fifth amendment pro-
tects a person's right to remain silent by prohibiting "the impo-
sition of any sanction which makes the assertion of the ...
privilege 'costly.' "132 The district court admitted that Doe dif-
fered from many of the Supreme Court's economic penalty
cases in that no summons or subpoena forces students to give
information to the government. Nonetheless, the court con-
cluded that because the denial of an opportunity to pursue
one's education and chosen profession "is a severe penalty in
this society," such denial "makes assertion of the privilege
costly, thereby compelling self-incrimination." 3 3
129. Id. at 493. A New Jersey statute required all public officers to testify
concerning their work or else lose their positions and eligiblility for future pub-
lic employment in the state. Id. at 494-95 n.1. No immunity statute was applica-
ble. Id- at 495. After answering the questions, the police officers were
convicted of conspiracy to obstruct the administration of the traffic laws. Id.
Justice Douglas, finding compulsion in the choice of whether to forfeit one's job
or incriminate oneself, observed: "Where the choice is 'between the rock and
the whirlpool,' duress is inherent in deciding to 'waive' one or the other." Id. at
498, quoted in Doe I, 557 F. Supp. at 948.
130. 385 U.S. 511 (1967).
131. The petitioner had failed to honor a subpoena duces tecum at a discipli-
nary proceeding for professional misconduct. Id. at 512. The Court, in a 5-4
opinion, overruled Cohen v. Hurley, 366 U.S. 117 (1961), in which the Court up-
held a disbarment under similar circumstances. Cohen had been decided
before Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964), established that the fifth amendment
privilege against self-incrimination was applicable to the states through the
fourteenth amendment. See Spevack, 385 U.S. at 513-14.
132. Id. at 515 (quoting Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 611 (1965)), quoted
in Doe I, 557 F. Supp. at 948.
133. Doe I, 557 F. Supp. at 949. The court also distinguished-or considered
wrongly decided if not distinguishable-Field v. Brown, 610 F.2d 981 (D.C. Cir.
1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 939 (1980). In Field, the District of Columbia Circuit
upheld Defense Department regulations that requested retired military officers
to certify that they were not engaged in impermissible sales to the armed serv-
ices. 610 F.2d at 982-83. Although the original form of the regulation mandated
compliance, the revised version contained a Privacy Act disclosure and ex-
pressly provided that failure to file would not trigger criminal sanctions. Id. at
983 n.4.
The court distinguished Field on the grounds that the Defense Department
regulation was aimed at "a distinguished and honorable class, not a highly se-
lective group inherently suspect of criminal activities," Doe I, 557 F. Supp. at
950, and that the retired officers retained a "bona fide, voluntary choice whether
to complete the form or not," id. (quoting Field, 610 F.2d at 989). The first dis-
tinction has been used by the Court to distinguish such forms as tax returns
that individuals, though they can assert their fifth amendment rights by refus-
ing to answer specific questions, may not withhold altogether, see United States
v. Sullivan, 274 U.S. 259 (1927), from those involved in Marchetti and Albertson,
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The self-incrimination analysis in Doe is fatally flawed,
however, because the requisite compulsion is lacking. 3 4 The
nature of the compulsion inherent in self-incrimination situa-
tions is best described.by Justice Goldberg's observation in
Murphy v. Waterfront Commission135 that the fifth amendment
was designed to protect against subjecting "those suspected of
crime to the cruel trilemma of self-accusation, perjury, or con-
tempt."' 3 6 Although the Solomon Amendment may serve to en-
courage, or even coerce, students to register with the Selective
Service, neither criminal nor economic sanctions compel them
to incriminate themselves. An examination of the Marchetti
and Garrity lines of cases demonstrates this.
The district court improperly relied on Marchetti in re-
jecting the proposition that the option of foregoing aid applica-
tion constitutes a valid, noncoerced choice which insulates
section 1113 from a fifth amendment attack.137 The court
claimed that such reasoning was similar to that in the pre-
Marchetti case of Lewis v. United States,13 8 in which the Court
held that a wagering tax statute was not unconstitutional be-
cause the gamblers retained the option of whether or not to
gamble, and electing not to gamble would exempt them from
the tax and registration requirements.1 39 As the district court
supra note 120, which an individual can justifiably refuse to return because of
their self-incriminating nature. See Albertson, 382 U.S. at 79.
The court found that the Solomon Amendment fit the latter group. Doe I,
557 F. Supp at 950. Since all aid applicants must complete the statement of
compliance, however, the characterization of § 1113 as being directed at a small
group of likely violators is at least debatable. Fortunately, this problem need
not be resolved so long as the compulsion element is missing. See infra text
accompanying notes 134-148.
134. The Supreme Court recently emphasized the necessity of the compul-
sion requirement in fifth amendment cases, quoting Professor Levy's observa-
tion that "[t]he element of compulsion or involuntariness was always an
ingredient of the right and, before the right existed, of protests against incrimi-
nating interrogatories." L. LEvY, supra note 118, at 328, quoted in South Da-
kota v. Neville, 103 S. Ct. 916, 922 (1983) (upholding South Dakota statute
permitting admission of evidence of refusal to submit to blood-alcohol test).
For an article focusing on the compulsion requirement, see Ritchie, Compulsion
That Violates the Fifth Amendment: The Burger Court's Definition, 61 MINrN. L.
REV. 383 (1977).
135. 378 U.S. 52 (1964) (holding that in order to guarantee that state wit-
nesses granted immunity from state prosecution may be compelled to answer
without infringing upon their fifth amendment rights, the federal government is
prohibited from making use of the compelled testimony or its fruits).
136. Id. at 55.
137. Doe I, 557 F. Supp. at 948-49.
138. 348 U.S. 419 (1955).
139. Id. at 422. Justice Mlinton's majority opinion noted that "there is no
constitutional right to gamble." Id. at 423, quoted in Marchetti, 390 U.S. at 51.
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noted, however, Marchetti specifically rejected this rationale:
"The question is not whether petitioner holds a 'right' to violate
state [wagering] law, but whether, having done so, he may be
compelled to give evidence against himself."140 Students who
need financial aid, the court contended, "have no more 'choice'
whether to fie [for financial aid] than did the gambler who
could 'choose' not to gamble."14 1 This analogy, however, re-
flects a misreading of Marchetti. In Marchetti, not only was wa-
gering illegal, but gamblers were compelled, on pain of criminal
prosecution, to register as gamblers with the IRS and pay the
special tax.142 Thus, Marchetti stands for the proposition that
regardless of the impermissibility of the underlying crime,
whether it be gambling or nonregistration, suspected violators
may not be compelled by law to incriminate themselves. The
plaintiffs in Doe, although subject to possible criminal prosecu-
tion for nonregistration, violate no law if they decide, in order
to avoid self-incrimination, not to apply for aid.
The rule of the "economic penalty" cases1 43 does not alter
the conclusion that section 1113 imposes no unconstitutional
compulsion. One might distinguish Garrity and Spevack from
Doe by comparing the quantum of economic penalty involved.
But such a weighing of the relative severity of losing one's job
against being deprived of student aid would not only create
confusion as to what constitutes an economic penalty,144 but it
would also ignore two fundamental differences between the
choice in Garrity and that facing the nonregistrant.
If escapable, the Solomon Amendment poses a different
conflict from the one present in the economic penalty cases.
140. Doe I, 557 F. Supp. at 948 (quoting Marchetti, 390 U.S. at 51).
141. Doe I, 557 F. Supp. at 949. A more apt analogy would be that students
have no more choice whether to register than did the gambler who could
choose not to gamble, since, as explained below, they obviously do have a
noncoerced choice of whether or not to apply for aid. See infra text accompa-
nying notes 143-48.
142. Recall that Marchetti was not convicted of the underlying crime of
gambling, but of failure to fill out the self-incriminating registration and tax
forms. See supra note 120.
143. In addition to the cases discussed supra notes 127-33 and accompany-
ing text, see Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70 (1973) (New York statute preclud-
ing award of government contract to anyone who refuses to waive immunity
when called to testify about any contract is unconstitutional); Uniformed Sani-
tation Men Ass'n v. Commissioner of Sanitation, 392 U.S. 280 (1968) (dismissal
of city employee for refusal to sign waiver of immunity unconstitutional, al-
though city could demand that workers, on pain of dismissal, answer specific
questions narrowly related to their job).
144. For a discussion of the related issue of whether denial of a privilege
can constitute punishment, see supra notes 48-51 and accompanying text.
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The police officer in Garrity, for example, was confronted with
the "cruel trilemma" of incriminating himself, committing per-
jury, or losing his job.145 Section 1113, on the other hand, leaves
nonregistrant students with the options of registering, perjur-
ing themselves, or forgoing federal financial aid. The fifth
amendment forbids the government from compelling the police
officers from incriminating themselves, but no constitutional
provision prevents the government from coercing nonregis-
trants to register. Because the Solomon Amendment allows
students to register late without penalty, section 1113 does not
compel self-incrimination but rather coerces late registration.
Even if the Solomon Amendment were not escapable, how-
ever, the compulsion in the Garrity line of cases is distinguish-
able from that in Doe. In the former, the Court found fifth
amendment violations because the threatened economic pen-
alty made exercise of the privilege costly, thereby compelling
self-incrimination. The police officer in Garrity, for example,
knew that continued employment, for the time being anyway,
depended on testifying without a grant of immunity. The
nonregistrant student finds himself in a fundamentally differ-
ent position because the Solomon Amendment conditions re-
ceipt of financial aid on registering with the Selective Service,
rather than on "testifying" regarding compliance by completing
a certification form.146 In other words, while the police officer
was compelled to incriminate himself to avoid immediate ter-
mination, the nonregistrant is not compelled, or even given any
incentive, to reveal his failure to register. Under the terms of
section 1113 he remains ineligible for aid until he registers, not
merely until he reveals whether he has registered.147 Revealing
his status leaves the nonregistrant in the same position as sim-
145. See 385 U.S. at 497.
146. A different case would exist if the scheme of the Solomon Amendment
were analogous to those statutes found unconstitutional in the economic pen-
alty cases. Suppose, for example, that the Solomon Amendment conditioned
eligibility for student aid not on compliance with the registration law, but sim-
ply on submission of a statement of registration status. The nonregistrant in
dire financial need would be compelled to incriminate himself in order to se-
cure the funds necessary to further his education. Such is not the case here,
however.
147. As stated in a government brief, "it is inconceivable that anyone is
compelled to apply for benefits for which he is ineligible." Jurisdictional State-
ment at 19, Selective Serv. Sys. v. Minnesota Pub. Interest Research Group. Of
course, the student may feel compelled to misstate his registration status to
qualify for aid. But the Court has recognized that perjury is not a choice pro-
tected by the fifth amendment. "Our legal system provides methods for chal-
lenging the Government's right to ask questions-lying is not one of them. A
citizen may decline to answer the question, or answer it honestly, but he can-
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ply foregoing applying for aid altogether. 148 The Solomon
Amendment thus lacks the compulsion required for a fifth
amendment violation.
III. CONCLUSION
The Solomon Amendment has generated considerable con-
troversy since its passage in 1982. Although much of the dissat-
isfaction seems to stem from disagreement with the draft
registration requirement, one may favor registration and still
question the wisdom of enforcing it with financial aid disqualifi-
cation. Whatever its faults as policy, however, the Solomon
Amendment is constitutionally sound. It neither constitutes a
bill of attainder nor compels self-incrimination.
By adopting an unnecessarily strict reading of the Solomon
Amendment, the district court mistakenly characterized the
amendment as inflicting punishment for bill of attainder pur-
poses. Instead, the court should have concluded that the statu-
tory language is ambiguous and turned to the Department of
Education regulations and the legislative record for guidance
as to the congressional purpose. Interpreted consistently with
these sources, the Solomon Amendment permits nonregis-
trants to escape the disqualification by registering late. Be-
cause this escape legitimates the alternative nonpunitive
purpose of encouraging registration, the disqualification does
not constitute punishment under the functional Nixon test for
bills of attainder.
Likewise, the court's self-incrimination analysis overlooked
the fundamental difference between the Solomon Amend-
ment's disqualification for failure to register and the type of
not with impunity knowingly and willfully answer with a falsehood." Bryson v.
United States, 396 U.S. 64, 72 (1969).
148. See Doe I, 557 F. Supp. at 947. MPIRG argued that § 1113 compels self-
incrimination because the Selective Service could track down lawbreakers by
investigating those students who had applied for aid in one year but not the
next, presumably because they had not registered. Plaintiffs' Memorandum in
Support of Its Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 39-40, Doe I. Thus, students
not registering and foregoing aid would still risk self-incrimination. In Field,
however, the District of Columbia Circuit upheld the Defense Department reg-
ulation because the "implied threat that failure to complete and file DD Form
1357 could lead to an investigation does not, by itself, violate a constitutional
privilege against self-incrimination." 610 F.2d at 989. See also supra note 133.
The likelihood that the Selective Service would undergo a relatively round-
about method of identifying nonregistrants is seemingly much less than the
chance that the Defense Department in Field would investigate those retired
officers who failed to certify noninvolvement in impermissible military sales.
Certainly, it does not meet the "real and substantial dangers" required under
fifth amendment analysis. See supra text accompanying note 122.
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compulsion required for a fifth amendment violation. Admit-
tedly, students who wish to receive financial aid must complete
the necessary application forms, including the statement of re-
gistration compliance. The Solomon Amendment, however,
does not thereby compel nonregistrants to risk revealing their
status by applying for aid; those who reveal their nonregistra-
tion are denied aid just as surely as are those who never apply
at all.
Robert D. Jacob
